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similar cases, and that the problem of the effectof war upon contracts
of life insurance must still be grappled with as one unsolved.
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COMPANY.
A court having regular terms has no power to adjourn to a time after the commencement of another regular term of the same court in the same county, where
both terms are of the same character.
And it makes no difference that the adjournment is had for the purpose of completing the trial of a single case already commenced, and that all the other cases
are continued.
Where a judge, by agreement of parties, goes on with the hearing of a case and
renders judgment after the close of a term, the judgment is rendered as of the term,
and the agreement of the parties is the sole authority for the proceeding.
A civil term may be continued into or adjourned beyond a regular criminal term
of the same court in the same county, and vice versd.

TRhpS iss on the case for-an injury from the negligence of the
defendants in not keeping the track of their road in proper repair;
brought to the Supesior Court in Fairfield county, and heard in
damages, after a demurrer of the defendants overruled.
. The case was heard at the October term of the court 1874.
-The judge of the court who had been regularly assigned to hold
the October term, and who had held and was still holding the same,
began the hearing in damages in the case on the 17th day of November, and continued the hearing until the 19th day of November,
-when, by reason of judicial duties elsewhere, he was obliged th suspend the hearing, and accordingly adjourned the same, and the
October term of the court, until the 5th day of January 1875, for
the sole purpose of completing the hearing in damages in this case,
and for the transaction of no other business whatsoever, the judge
distinctly announcing this to all parties interested in the business
of the court. Neither party to this action objected at that time to
such adjournment.
Upon the opening of the court at the time to which it had been
adjourned, on the 5th day of January 1875, the counsel for the
defendants objected to any further hearing in damages in the case
VOL. XXV.-83,

658

JAQUES v. BRIDGEPORT HORSE-RAILROAD CO.

by the court, on the ground that the court could not lawfully sit or
do any business on and after that day, as the December term 1874
of the court then was, and for some days previously had been, in
session in the county. But the judge who had commenced the
hearing in damages being then present and holding the court, directed the parties to proceed with the hearing, and thereupon the
hearing in damages was proceeded with before said judge, who continued the hearing and the court by regular adjournments for many
days thereafter, heard the plaintiff and defendants with their witnesses and the arguments of counsel, and rendered judgment for
the plaintiff to recover of the defendants the sum of $5600, with
costs of suit.
The defendants moved for a new trial for 'error in the above
ruling and action of the court.

G. H. JFatrousand G. Stoddard, in support of the motion.
H. S. Sanford, contra.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
C. J.-The question in this. case is, whether the judge of
the Superior Court, holding the October civil term of the court in
Fairfield county, had power to adjourn the court to the 5th day of
January following, for the purpose of completing the hearing of
the present case, when there was another civil term of the same
court to be holden by law "n the second Tuesday of December.
It appears that the adjournment was made- without any agreement
of the parties, though without any objection made at the time; but
that, when the day to which the court was adjourned arrived, and
the judge was about to proceed with the hearing, the counsel for
the defendants protested against the proceeding, and claimed. that
the judge had no further jurisdiction of the case, on the ground
that the adjournment of the October term to a time beyond the
commencement of the December term was unauthorized by law,
and consequently of no effect. But the judge decided to go on and
hear the case, which was done; and the question is, whether he
had power to do so.
It sometimes happens that during the session of a court, the parties to a cause pending in it agree that the judge holding the court
may hear the case after the term shall have ended, and render judgment as of the term. But in such cases the judge derives his authorPARK,
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ity in the matter from the agreement of the parties, and not from
any supposed continuance of the term. But that was not this case.
Here there was no agreement that the judge might hear the case
afier the close of the term. The judge himself did not treat it as
such a case, but attempted to adjourn the court itself to the time
fixed for taking up the trial, and he went on with the trial against
the protest of the defendants, and wholly upon his supposed authority to adjourn the October term of the court into, or beyond, the
December civil term of the same court.
We think this could not be done. The regular terms of the
Superior Court are fixed by statute to commence at definite times,
and all cases continued in the court go from one term to another
in regular succession, which could not be done if one civil term
could be carried into or beyond another term of the same character.
Although all the causes pending in the court might be continued
by order of the court, except certain specified ones, still the judge
continues to have control over his orders and judgments during the
term, and while it continues he may revoke them as occasion may
require. This is every day's practice. The business of the court
could not be successfully carried on unless the judge had this control over his own orders and decrees during the term. Hence, if
the October term of the court in this case was in existence on the
5th day of January 1875, all the entries of causes continued tothe December term 1874 might have been revoked, and the causes
brought back into the docket of the court. Suppose this had been
done, and suppose that some of the cases which had been continued
had been tried at the December term, what would have become of
them, and what would have become of the December term? It is
easy to see.that a judge would have it in his power in such a case
to nullify, in effect, not only the next succeeding term, but many
succeeding terms, so far as the old cases are concerned, by continuing his own term; for if he can continue one case with his term,
he can just as well continue all the cases upon the docket. And
if there were no other objection, it is manifest that great confusion
would result from such a practice. If one term can thus be con-tinued, so could all the terms in the county, and the result'would
be that many regular terms of the same court might be in existence
at the same time in the same county, and it would be impossible to
know to what term a case belonged. We are satisfied that one regular civil term of the court cannot be continued after the time pre-
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scribed for the commencement of another regular civil term in the
same county.
This conclusion does not apply to terms of different character.
One criminal term may be continued beyond, and may be in existence after, the beginning of a regular civil term, and so a civil
term may run into or beyond a criminal term of the same court in
the same county.
The view we have taken of this question renders it unnecessary
to consider the other questions in the case.
A new trial is advised.
Upon the question directly involved
in the principal case, viz., the power
of a court to adjourn a term for the purpose of completing the trial of a civil
cause, already begun before it, to a time
after the commencement of another regular civil term of the same court, we
have found no other decided case and
the argumentum ab inconvenienti which is
urged in the opinion is certainly under
the circumstances to be considered as of
greai weight. In criminal law, however, a different view has at least in one
case apparently been taken. In Carroll v. Commonwealth, 4 Weekly Notes
109 (1877), the case was called for trial
in June term 1876 of the court of Oyer
and Terminer, but the jury was not completed until the last day of the term.
The jury was then sworn and the court
having adjourned from time to time the
trial was not practically begun until
July 13th, which was in July term,
when the counsel for the defence objected
that the term had expired and that no
precept had issued to hold a special
court at the time (July 13th), which
could have been done b, statute, and
asked that'the jury should be discharged.
The court refused to discharge the jury
and the trial proceeded. On error it
was argued that, though a jury impanelled during a regular term and actually
engaged in the trial of a ctise -could be'
kept togethei after the term, yet the
court could not impanel a jury and keep
it waiting until required, and that there-

fore the case should have been considered as begun at July term and the June
jury should have been discharged. The
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed
the action of the court below, relying
to an extent at least on Bricdand v.
Commonwealth, 24 P. F. Smith 463, in
which, however, the facts were somewhat different, for in that case the jury
had heard the evidence and had been
charged on the last day of February
term and had been kept together to consider its verdict until three days beyond
the term, so that the trial was unquestionably continuous and unbroken,
whereas, in Carroll's case, the court
went a step farther and held the swearing
of the jury to be the commencement of
the trial, and the break between it and
the practical commencement of no consequence. In this we think the court was
right, but it would seem as though its
decision wer6 in conflict with the principal case, as it was an adjournment of
a case actually commenced to a time
after the commencement of a regular
term of the same character, unless it is
thought that there is a necessary difference between civil and criminal terms.
With regard to the effect of the expiration of a term, there are some questions which have more frequently arisen
and which may now be said to be the
only survivors of the army of consequences which formerly followed in the
train of the old English doctrine of the
completeness of each term, standing by
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itself; an idea which probably came
from the maner of making up the
record in England and which has really
very little application in this country;
and although it.is maintained to a certain extent, as is so far useful, yet it is
rather as fixing in some cases a convenient bar to litigation than as having any
inherently sacred or unassailable character, that the term is here allowed to
be the limit within which certain acts
may be done. What some of the acts
are we will consider. Within term,
even after judgment, a court retains absolute control of its record and may alter,
modify or set aside judgments or even
sentences. It is true that the case of
The King v. Wingfield, Cro. Car. 251,
seems to hold the contrary and as reported states generally, "And it was
resolved that such fines assessed in
court by judgment upon an information
cannot be afterwards qualified or mitigated," yet it is of questionable authority, and as early'as Redding's Case, Sir
T. Ray. 376 (1680), we find the King's
Bench remitting a fine on the last day
of the term. In King v. Price, 6 East
322 (1805), a sentence was altered during term, and in Darling v. Gurney, 2
Dowl. 101, it was held that a judgment
could be altered in term. A court may
even increase the severity of its sentence, at the term at which it was imposed, provided it remains yet unexecuted, as was done in Jobe v. nZe Sate,
28 Ga. 235 (1859), and Commonwealth
v. lVeynouth, 2 Allen 144 (1861).
After term, however, a judgment obtained after a trial or hearing, or, what
is sometimes called an adversary judgment, cannot be opened. In Catlin v.
Robinson, 2 Watts 373 (1834), GiBsow,
C. J., remarked, "it would be sufficient
to show the illegality of the proceeding
that the judgment was opened after the
power of the court over it was at an end.
It was rendered at November term
1826, and the premises were sold on a
lev. fac. to the succeeding term. At

November term 1829 the settlers obtained a rule to show cause why the
judgment should not be opened and they
let into a defence. * * * Now it is in
vain to say that this was done in the
exercise of a judicial discretion which
is not a subject of revision here. The
day of discretion was past. It is undoubtedly true in the abstract that the
opening of a judgment is not a matter
for correction on a writ of error, but it
is also true that for excess, of power the
act may be annulled."
In King v.
Brooks, 22 P. F. Smith 363 (1872),
SUARSWOODI J., said, " in the case of
judgments entered adversely after a
.hearing or trial it is settled that it [i. e.
the opening of a judgment] must be
done before the end of the term at which
.they are entered." The rule is also
recognised in Mather'sEx. v. Paterson,
See also Brush
9 Casey 485 (1859).
v. Bobbins, 3 McLean 486 (1844) ;
Huston v. MAitchell, 14 S. & R. 307
(1836) ; Castle v. Reynolds, 10 Watts
51; Miller v. Gallagher, I Weekly
Notes 8. Nor is a judgment or sentence
amendable. In Prince v. Nicholson, 1
Marsh. 401 ; s. c. 6 Taunt. 45 (1815).
GiBas, L. C. J., asked "How can we
amend ajudgment after term ?" In Albers v. Whitney, 1 Story 312 (1840),
STORY, J., said, "It is plain that at
common law no judgment was amendable after the term at'Which it was entered." In this case the name of the
defendant, as to whose identity there
was no dispute, had been mis-stated as
"Jamm H." instead of.Tohn H., and it
was sought to amend by inserting the
true name in the record after judgment
and after term. This Sroar, J., refused to allow, as it could not have been
done at common law and there was no
United States statute permitting such
amendment. In Ulery v. Clark, 6 Harris 148 (1851), there had been an arbitration in which the arbitrators in 1846
had made an award in favor of the plaintiff, the defendant appealed and the plain-
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tiff
obtained a verdict for somewhat less
than the amount of the award, on which
verdict judguient was erroneously entered without costs. In 1850 the court ordered judgment to be entered with costs.
This the Supreme Court held to be error.
In the opinion CHAMBERS, J., after referring to Sephens v. Cowan (infra 664),
said, "The entry of the second judgment
with costs is not to correct an error committed in expressing what was intended
or directed, but, after an interval of
nearly two years, to correct what the
court on further reflection considered an
error in their first judgment and after
proceedings had on that point. If this
were allowed it could never be known
when a judgment was final."
In re Mason, 8 Mich. 70 (1860), it was
held that a sentence, though manifestly
wrong, when viewed in the light of facts
afterwards brought forward, could not
be altered after term. Upon this particular point Commonwealth v. Mayloy
et al., 7.P. F. Smith 291 (1868), is a
case of especial interest. In accordance
with a practice which had prevailed for
some time in the criminal courts of
Philadelphia, a rule was entered at the
term at which a sentence had been
imposed to reconsider the said sentence,
which rule after ter was made Ubsolute
and the prisoners sentenced to a shorter
term of imprisonment than that originally imposed, whereupon the attorney-general took a writ of error. The
Supreme Court held the action of the
court below erroneous and upheld the
general rule of the finality of a sentence.
With reference to the rule to reconsider,
Toxresox, C. J., said, "But ithas
been argued that the rule, to reconsider
within the -term, is a modification ipso
facto of the rule which regards the finality of the sentence. The difficulty is to
find authority for the rule. A principle
is often limited in itsscope by other
principles and when so the operation is
the result of law. But it is quite another thing to make a rule to control a

principle. This is legislation. To go
the extent of the argument would be to
set aside the maxims of the law with
reference to the finality of judgments
and sentences. 'Interest reipublia: res
judicata non rescindi' and ' res judicata
veritate accipitur.' "
It is to be observed that the term rule
does not apply to judgments by default
or confession. In KaulbaCh v.Fi."er,
1 Rawle 323 (1829), a judgment on a
warrant entered in 1820 and revived by
sai. fa. and judgment thereon by consent was held by the Supreme Court to
have been properly opened in 1827.
See also Castlev. Reynolds,supra ; King
v. Brooks, supra; and Bredin v. Gilliland, 17 P. F. Smith 37 (1871), in
which SHAxRSWOOD, J., said,*" In the
nature of the case there is not and ought
not to be any limitation of time to the
power of a court to open a judgment
entered by default for want of appearance."
Even with reference to adversar
judgments there are certain corrections
which a court can make even after term,
as, first, it can correct clerical errors
and supply the omissions of its recording officer. In Murray v. Cooper, 6 S.
& R. 126 (1820), where on a plea of
nul tiel
record the court, in 1808, decided
in favor of the plaintiff, but the prothonotary neglected to enter judgment; the
defendant took a writ of error which
was non-prossed, and, in 1812, another
which was non-prossed in 1815 because "
no judgment appeared of record; in
1816 the court below, after argument,
entered judgment nunc pro tune and this
was affirmed on error. In Balch v.
Shaw, 7, Cush. 282 (1851), it was said
by FLETCERL,.J., "it is competent for
a court of record under its general inherent and necessary authority to correct the mistakes and supply the defects
of its clerk or recording officer so as to
have the record conform to the actual
facts and truth of the case, and that this
may be done at any time, as well after
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as during the term nunc pro tune." See
also Fay v. Wenzell, 8 Cush. 315
(1851).
Second, a court may correct miscalculations. In The King v. Stephens, 3
Smith 366 (1806), the defendants had
been found guilty of taking bribes from
a native prince in the East Indies ; part
of the penalty was the payment of the
amount corruptly received. It appeared
that in drawing up the judgment, a
mistake had been made in calculating
the value of the foreign coin in which
the bribes had been received. It was
held that the rule for judgment against
the prisoners and the entry roll as to
the amount of punishment might be
amended after term, though not the
judgment and verdict.
In Sadler v. Evans, 4 Bur. 1987, there
had been a nonsuit and costs taxed by
the master. After the lapse of more
than one term the plaintiff applied to
have certain costs, which had been taxed
against him and which had not been
occasioned by his fault, set aside. It was
argued that as the record of the case
was still in the court, having come back
after a writ of error had been non-prossed,"
the court might still amend.' The court
held the application one to alter the
judgment, and therefore too late, but
Lord MANSFIELD recognised the power
of the court to correct a miscalculation
after term, saying, "If a manifest miscomputation or any plain mistake in
figures should appear on the face of the
record with regard to costs, I should
think it might be amended," but the
other judges in their remarks held that
the attempt was to substantially alter
the judgment, " not in a matter of mere
mistake, but of judgment." The distinction was therefore taken between
altering a judgment and merely giving
it its proper application by freeing the
record from an apparent error induced
by a miscomputation.
The doctrine of miscalculations being
amendable was carried farther in the
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Sheppard Contested Election Case, 27 P.
In that case
F. Sqith 295 (1875).
Sheppard was returned as elected to the
office of district attorney. A petition
contesting the election was filed in October term 1868, and in October term 1869
the Court of Quarter Sessions decided
in favor of the contestant, whereupon,
October 19th 1869, the record was removed to the Supreme Court by certiorari; on the 25th the contestant was
sworn into office, on the 28th Sheppard
presented in the court below a petition
alleging certain errors in the calculation by which the court arrived at the
conclusion that the contestant was
elected. In March 1870 the record
came back to the Quarter Sessions
affirmed. The Quarter Sessions then,
having considered Mr. S.'s petition,
made a recalculation and declared Mr.
Sheppard elected. In the opinion of
the court ALLISoN, P. J., said, "We
can claim to have given the case a most
careful examination, with all these
lights to aid us. In this examination
we have adheredfirmlSj to the principles
containedin the opiiion of the court, which
was delivered by Judge BREWSTER.'
In nothing have they been varied or
departed from. We have confined ourselves to the correction of the account,
where figures have been required to be
placed in it, in consequence of accidental oversight, with an abandonment of
an admitted error in the mode of stating
the account in purging a poll and with
the revision of our judgment upon the
evidence as to whether votes to be received are legal or illegal votes." The
Supreme Court sustained the action of
the Quarter Sessions, though from the
opinion delivered it may be a little
doubtful whether it was on the ground
that the action was a mere correction
of miscalculation or because .the power
of the court having been suspended by
the certiorari, the term constructively
continued, for, while AGNEW, C. J.,
said, "The term had passed only in

BARDEN v. BOSTON, &c., RAILROAD CO.
- point of time, not of judicial cognisance," he also said, " It is a false
analogy to liken this case to the attempt
of a court to rejudge its judgment after
the term was passed. This is no such
attempt. There was a manifest mistake
of calculation shown by the notes of the
judge."
The case of tephens v. Cowan, 6
Watts 511 (1837), seems hardly to fall
under either of the foregoing heads. In
that case, in October term,-a case stated
in ejectment was submitted to the court
and judgment was given for the plaintiff on the day before the end of the term
and entered accordingly. A few days
after the term had expired the judge
found that he had made a mistake as to
the parties and had given judgment for
the plaintiff under the impression that
that person was the defendant. He
accordingly directed the prothonotary to
enter judgment for the defendant and
at December term made absolute a rule
to strike off the previous entry of judgment for the plaintiff. In the Supreme
Court, KENND-T, J., said, "It
is
doubtless true that after the end of the
term in which the court has rendered
judgment upon a case stated or a special
or general verdict, from which an appeal may be taken by writ of error or
otherwise, it cannot alter or change it
with a view to correct what the court
upon further reflection may consider an
error therein, But it would be going

too far to say that such court may not
afterwards, before any proceeding has
been had upon the judgment, correct a
mere mistake that has arisen in entering it differently from what was intended
and perhaps directed. Whenever there
is something to correct by, as, for instance, the notes of the presiding judge,
no danger need be apprehended from
doing so, and the general rule on this
subject as well as the reason of the thing
would seem to justify it. Here it would
seem that the design of the court was to
enter judgment for the patentee, believing him at the moment to be the plaintiff when in fact he was the defendant,
and under this misapprehension entered
the judgment for the plaintiff." This
case, it will be seen, allows much more
than the correction of a mere miscalculation or the clerical error or omission
of a recording officer. It permits' the
court to correct, after term, an entry
made through its own misapprehension,
and yet it seems perfectly consonant
with law and reason. The true rule on
the subject of amendments after term
would seem to be suggested by the remark of AGNEw, C. J., supra, and
might be stated to be that an amendment should be allowed, where the
allowance is not either directly or in
effect a rejudging of the cause, and of
course with due respect to the intervening rights of third persons.
H. BpVDD, JR.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massac)u8etts.
JOHN-A. BARDEN v. BOSTON, CLINTON AND FITCHBURG

RAILROAD COMPANY.
A passenger in a car of a railroad corporation, on the station to which he was
going being announced, and after the car had entered the station, left his seat and
stood inside the closed door of the car, for the purpose of hastening his departure
from the car. While he was so standing, the car came into collision with another
car, and the passenger was thrown down and injured. Held, in an action by him
against the railroad corporation, that the question, whether he was in the exercise
of reasonable care, was for the jury.
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TORT for personal injuries received by the plaintiff while a passenger in a car of the defendants. Trial in the Superior Court,
before ALLEN, J., who, by consent of the parties, before verdict,
reported the case for the determination of this court, in substance,
as follows :The plaintiff purchased of the defendant a ticket at Attleborough
for Taunton, and entered the defendant's train for that city. A
short distance before arriving at the station in Taunton, in the daytime, the engine and one passenger car containing passengers for
Taunton were switched off on a side track, leaving the car in which
the plaintiff was to run down the main track and connect with the
train from Boston for New Bedford, which was waiting-on the track
in the station for the train from Attleborough.
The car containing the plaintiff was so carelessly and negligently
run into the station as to come in violent collision with the other
train standing in the stationand with such force as to throw the
plaintiff upon and against the seats and the floor of the car, breaking
three of his ribs, inflicting a severe-wound on his head, and injuring
his left shoulder and arm.
The plaintiff was occupying the seat next the closet on the right
side of the car, at the rear end, and, when the approach of the car
to the station at Taunton was announced, he arose from his seat
and stood in the aisle, preparatory to leaving it when the car should
stop, and while so standing the collision took place. He stood at
the time three or four feet from the door, which was shut, and had
not been opened or touched by him.
The defendant contended that the evidence tended to establish
the foregoing facts, and that, if so, the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence, as a matter of law, which would preclude his
recovery. The plaintiff contended that it was a question for the jury.
If the plaintiff on these facts was guilty of such negligence, as
matter of law, as to preclude a recovery, judgment was to be entered
for the defendant; but if, on the other hand, the plaintiff, as matter
of law, was not guilty of contributory negligence, or if that question
was for the jury upon the foregoing facts, then judgment was to be
entered for the plaintiff in the sum of $8000 and costs.
. -Daggett and -.
by the court.

.f. Bennett, for the plaintiff, were stopped

G. A. Torrey, for the defendant.
VOL. XXV.-8
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GRAY, C. J.-We can have no doubt that the contract between
the parties, which required the corporation to furnish the plaintiff
with a seat, did not, as matter of law, oblige him to keep it from
the time lie first took it until the train had come to a final stop at
the place of his destination; and that the question whether he was
wanting in reasonable care in leaving his seat and standing in the
passage-way inside the closed door, after the approach of the train
to the station at which he was to alight had been announced and
the car had actually entered the station, and for the purpose of
hastening his departure from the car, was a question of fact for the
jury.
In the cases on which the defendant mainly relies, the plaintiff
was not, as in this case, wholly within the car: Hickey v. Boston
& Lowell Railroad Co., 14 Allen 429; Todd v. Old Colony R ailroad Co., 3 Id. 18, and 7 Id. 207 ; Pittsburgh& Connellsville Railroad Co. v. McClurg, 56 Penna. St. 294.
Judgment for the plaintiff.
Few legal questions are more perplexing, few in which the decisions are
more conflicting, than the one involved
in the foregoing case.
On the one hand it is tolerably well
settled (with perhaps a few dissenting
opinions) that attempting to leave or
enter a car while in rapid motion, is-, in
the absence of some paramount excuse,
such as to escape from obvious danger,
and the like, such an act of negligence
as to preclude a recovery for an injury
sustained in consequence of such an
attempt, although the company was
itself guilty of positive negligence in
its own management of the trains. See
Harvey v. Eastern Railroad Co., 116
Mass. 269 ; flicicey v. Boston 4. Lowell
Railroad Co., 14 Allen 429; Lucas v.
New Bedford Railroad Co., 6 Gray 64;
Gavett v. Manchester4-Lawrence Railroad
Co., 16 ld. 501 f Illinois CentralRailroad
Co. v. Slatton, 54 Ill. 133; Ohio 6- Miss.
Railway Co. v. Stratton, 78 Id. 88;
though there may be special circumstances which make it a question of fact
for the jury whether attempting to leave

or enter a train before it comes to a
stand still is negligence in the passenger.
See "Johnstonv. West Chester, 4-c., Railway Co., 11 Am. Law Reg. N. S. 159,
s. c. 70 Penna. St. 357 ; Flerv. New
York Central Railway Co., 49 N. Y.
47; Doss v. Missouri Ra'ilroad Co., 59
Mo. 27; Pennsylvania Railroad Co. v.
Kilgore, 32 Penna. St. 292.
And this rule applies to one who
thrusts his arm or body outside of a car
window, and thus receives an injury
which he would have escaped had he
remained within: Todd v. Old Colony
Railroad Co., 3 Allen 18;
Id. 207;
Indianapolis,4-a., Railroad Co. v. Rutherford, 7 Am. Law Reg. N. S. 476, s. c.
29 Ind. 82; Pittsburgh 6- Connellsville
Railroad Co. v. MaClurg, 7 Am. Law
Reg. N. S. 277, s. c. 56 Penna. St.
294; Louisville 4- Nashville RailroadCo.
v. Sickings, 5 Bush 1.
. On the other hand, merely preparing
to leave a car, standing in one's seat or
the aisle, walking to and fro in the
car, has been thought not to be an act
of negligence, per se, for the court to
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adopt as a matter of law, but rather a
question for the jury in each individual
case, as was held above: Railroad Co.
v. Pollard, 22 Wall. 341 ; Nichols v.
Sixth Avenue Railroad Co., 39 N. Y. 131.
In Gee v. The Metropolitan Railway
Co., Law Rep. 8 Q. B. 161, a passenger
on the under-ground railway in London
left his seat while the train was in full
motion, went to the door window, across
which there was a brass rod to prevent
passengers from putting their heads and
arms out, and placed his hand on the
rod for the purpose of looking out to see
the signal lights and show them to a
fellow passenger. The door flew open
and he fell out. It was held that there
was no contributory negligence, CocKBURN, C. J., saying: "The passenger
did nothing more than was within the
scope of his enjoyment while travelling
without committing any imprudence.
In passing through a beautiful country
he is certainly at liberty to stand up and
look at the view in the ordinary manner
of people travelling for pleasure."
And MELLOR, J., said: "I do not
agree with the defendant's counsel that
a passenger must sit still throughout
the journey."
This was the principal argument of
the company in Barden's Case : that as
the carrier was bound by law to furnish
each passenger with a seat, there was
the correlati i duty on his part to occupy
it the entire 1 "rney, or if he left it,
except for cases of health, necessity,
&c., he did so at his peril ; but the court
expressly deny such a conclusion to
follow from the admitted premise.

Besides, there was one more element
in Barden's Case, which might be entitled to some weight, and that is, that
he did not arise fron his seat until after
the servants of the company had announced the station to which he was
bound, and according to the upinion of
many this itself constitutes an invitation
to alight, and an assurance from the
company that he' may safely do so.
See eller v. London, Brighton 4- Suth
Coast Railway Co., Law Rep. 9 C. P.
126; Praeger v. Bristol 4- Exeter Railway Co., 24 L. T. (N. S.) 105 ; Robson
V. The North Eastern Railway Co., Law
Rep. 10 Q. B. 271 ; Foy v. London,
Brighton 4- South Coast Railway Co., 18
C. B. N. S. 225.
Thus we have two classes of cases, in
one of which the question of contributory negligence is one of law, and in
the other, one of fact. There remains
an intermediate one. A passenger
commences to enter a train while stationary. With one foot on the step of
the car and one on the platform of the'
station, he stops to converse with a
friend, and while in that situation the
train starts. In attempting to get on
after the train is in motion he is thrown
under the car wheel and injured. Is it
a question of law for the court, or of
fact for the jury, whether he was negligent in thus persisting in his attempt?
It was recently ruled in Massachusetts
upon that exact state of facts that it was
solely for the jury : Warner v. The Old
Colony Railroad Co., Bristol Co., April
term 1876.
EDMUND H. BENNETT.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
W. H. WOODS v. JAMES NORTH

ZT AL.

A clause in a promissory note allowing a commission upon it? face, as a colleation-fee, in case of its non-payment at maturity, renders the note uncertain and
destroys its negotiability.
A promissory note in the usual form contained, immediately after the amount,
the words "and five per cent. collection-fee if not paid when due." In an action
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by the holder against the endorser : Held, that the note was not negotiable, and
that defendant was therefore not liable as an endorser of negotiable paper.
Semile, the five per cent. for collection is not liquidated damages which would
pass to the holder absolutely, but is a penalty to cover a reasonable compensation
to an attorney in case ttle note has to be collected by legal proceedings.

ERROR to the Common Pleas of Huntingdon county.
Debt by James North et al., trading as the Union Bank of Huntingdon, against Woods as endorser of the following promissory
note :$877
Huntingdon, Pa., May 5th 1875.
Sixty days after date I promise to pay to the order of W. H.
Woods, at the Union Bank of Huntingdon, three hundred and seventy-seven dollars, and five per cent. collection-fee if not paid when
due, without defalcation, value received.
No. 14,915. Due July 7th.
SAMUEL STEFFEY.
[Endorsed] W. H. WOODS.

I waive protest, demand and notice of non-payment on the within note, July 7th 1875.
W. H. WOODS.
Defendant pleaded nil debet, and subsequently payment, with
leave, &c., and a special plea of usury.
Upon the trial of the case, the plaintiffs offered in evidence the
nlote sued on, which was objected to by the defendant on the ground
that the plaintiffs had declared as the holders of a negotiable promissory note against its endorser, whilst the note offered was not
negotiable because the collection clause contained in it rendered it
uncertain and contingent. Objection overruled, note admitted, and
exception sealed for defendant.
The defendant presented certain points for the instruction of the
jury, which, with the answers of the court thereto, were as follows:1. That under the evidence in this case the plaintiffs are not entitled to recover. Answer. We refuse to instruct you as requested
in this point, but instruct you directly the reverse, that they have
a right to recover whatever may be due upon this debt.
2. That if the court refuse to instruct the jury as prayed for in
the first point, then the defendant asks the court to instruct the
jury that the defendant is not liable to pay the five per cent. for
collection. Answer. We refuse to so instruct you. The contract
in the note was, that if it was not paid at maturity, the maker,
Steffey, would pay five per cent. additional for collection-fee. And
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Mr. Woods endorsed that contract and made himself liable to pay
it if Steffey did not.
The court further charged the jury, inter alia, as follows
"It is urged on the part of the defendant that the addition of these
words 'five per cent. collection-fee if not paid when due' destroys

the negotiable character of this note, and relieves him from any liability upon it as an endorser. We instruct you, as matter of law,
that the addition of these words does not destroy the negotiability
of the note, and it does not release Mr. Woods, the defendant, from
his liability as an endorser upon it."
Defendant excepted to the answers to the first and second points,.
and to that part of the charge above set forth. Verdict and judgment for plaintiffs. Defendant took this writ, assigning as error
the admission of the note in evidence, the answers to his points, and
so much of the charge as is above set forth.
Woods, p. p., and Wdlzamson, for plaintiff in error.-A promissory note must be certain and unconditional: Story on Prom.
Notes 1. If it be uncertain in amount, or accompanied by other
words that increase or diminish it according to circumstances, it
is void as a promissory note: Story on Bills, § 42; Byles on
Bills, p. 162; Patterson v. Poindexter,6 W. & S. 227; Overton
v. Tyler, 3 Barr 346 ; Sweeney v: Thelkstun, 27 P. F. Smith 131 ;
Ayrey v. Pearnsides, 4 M. & W. 168; .Fralickv. Norton, 2 Mich.

130.
Absolute certainty is required, and the rule id certum est quod
certum reddipotest does not apply.

That the present note is variable admits of no doubt, inasmuch
as it may be more or less according to the time of its paymentless if paid at maturity, more when suit is brought.
In any event, the endorser is not liable for the collection-fee.
His endorsement, as regards this, is similar to that of an endorser
of a note containing a waiver of the exemption; the waiver binding
the maker alone. Again, the collection clause in this note is only
binding on the maker when steps are taken towards its collection
from him, and expenses are incurred thereby. To permit its collection, in addition to the interest, simply because of th6 non-payment of the note at maturity, would be throwing but a thin veil
over usury.
K. Allen -Lovell,contra.-There is no uncertainty in the amount
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of the present note, such as should destroy its negotiability. It is
not at all analogous to any of the cases referred to by the other side.
In all those 'cases extrinsic evidence was required to establish the
amount due on the notes. This is the uncertainty that destroys
negotiability. Here the amount is apparent on the face of the
instrument, and needs no such evidence to fix it. The Pennsylvania cases relied on are also distinguishable on other grounds. In
Pattersonv. Poindexter, the instrument sued on contained no express promise to pay; whilst the instruments in Overton v. Tyler,
and Sweeney v. Thickstun, contained warrants of attorney. In the
latter case, there was also a collection-fee clause in the note ; but
the court carefully based their judgment upon the fact that the warrant of attorney rendered the note non-negotiable.
In Illinois a promissory note containing a collection clause somewhat similar to the present was held to possess all the requisites of
a valid promissory note: Nickerson v. Sheldon, 33 Ill. 372-4.
The tendency of courts has recently been towards giving a liberal
construction to instruments in determining the question of their
negotiability: Zimmerman v. Anderson, 17 P. F. Smith 421;
Hodges v. Shuler, 22 N. Y. 114.
The endorsement of p note creates a conditional contract by the
endorser to pay the holder the sum which the maker or preceding
endorsers should have paid, with such damages as the law allows:
Byles on Bills, pp. 3, 146-7; Story on Bills, § 107; Edwards on
Bills, § 288 (2d ed.).
Woods, therefore, in endorsing the present note, became liable
as well for the collection-fee as for the face of the note. His assumption that the case is similar to that of an endorser of a note waiving
the exemption law, is erroneous, that being the waiver of a-ersonal
right by the maker, and consequently not binding on the endorser.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
SHARSWOOD, J.-It' is a necessary quality of negotiable paper
that it sh6ulYd be simple, certain, unconditional-not subject to any
contingency; It would be a mere affectation of learning to cite
the elementary treatises and the decided cases which have established this principle. It is very important to the commercial community that it should be maintained in all its rigor. Applying it
to the, note sued upon in this case, we are of opinion that it violates
this rule. If it bad been made payable at sixty days with 5 per
cent., it would have been objectionable as usurious on its face. It
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would not, however, on that account have invalidated the note or
destroyed its negotiability. A negotiable note may be made payable with interest from its date, and, if more than lawful interest is
stipulated for, it does not, in Pennsylvania, make the contract void,
but only the usury. Hence such a note is sufficiently certain. It
is payable at maturity with lawful interest. But in the paper now
in question there enters as to the amount an undoubted element of
uncertainty. It is a mistake to suppose that, if the note was unpaid
at maturity, the five per cent. would be payable to the holder by
the parties. It must go into the hands of an attorney for collection.
It is not a sum necessarily payable. The phrase "collection-fee"
necessarily implies this. Not only so, but this amount of per centage cannot be arbitrarily determined by the parties. It must be
only what would be a reasonable compensation to an attorney for
collection. This in reason and the usage of the legal profession
depends upon the amount of the note. Five per cent. would probably be considered by a jury as a reasonable compensation upon
the collection of a note of $377. But if it were $3000 they would
probably think otherwise. And certainly so if it were $30,000.
Now then can this note be said to be certain as to its amount, or
that amount unaffected by any contingency? Interest and costs
of protest after non-payment at maturity are necessary legal incidents of the contract, and the insertion of them in the body of the
note would not affect its negotiability.
Neither does a clause waiving exemption, for that in no way
touches the simplicity and certainty of the paper. But a collateral
agreement, as here, depending, too, as it does upon its reasonableness
to be determined by the verdict of ajury, is entirely different. It may
be well characterized, like an agreement to confess ajudgment was by
Chief Justice GIBSON, as "luggage," which negotiable paper, riding
as it does on the wings of the wind, is not a courier able to carry.
If this collateral agreement may be introduced with impunity,
what may not be ? It is the first step in the wrong direction which
costs. These instruments may come to be lumbered up with all
sorts of stipulations and all sorts of difficulties-contentions and
litigation result. It is the best rule, obsta principiis.
Judgment reversed.
The particular point involved in the
foregoing case is of very recent appearance in litigation, and the decisions upon

it are at variance to a degree much to
be regretted, upon a subject where uniformity is so especially desirable.
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In Sweeney v. Thickstun, 77 Penna.
St. 131, the note sued on contained a
clause, that in case of non-payment at
maturity, five *per cent. collection fees
should be added; but the case was argued and decided upon the effect of a
warrant of attorney to confess judgment, also contained in the note; and
as it was'held that the negotiability of
the note was destroyed by the warrant,
the present point, although involved in
the case, was not touched by the court.
The principal case, however, in deciding the note not negotiable for want of
certainty in the sum payable, follows
logically the drift of the prior decisions
in Pennsylvania.
The Supreme Court of Missouri also
reached the same conclusion in .RFrst
National Bank of Trenton v. Gay, 63
Mo. 33 (1876). In that case the words
were, "If not paid at maturity, and
the same is placed in the hands of an
attorney for collection, we agree and
promise to pay an additional sum of
ten per cent. as attorney's fees." The
court held that any contingency in the
sum payable destroyed negotiability,
and that the maxim id cerium est quod
cerium reddi potest was not allowed, in
the case of negotiable paper, to supply
any lack of certainty in the statement
in the note itself of the sum payable,
quoting Ayrey v. Fearnsides, 4 M. & W.
168; Smith v. Nightingale, 2 Starkie
375; Bolton v. Dugdale, 4 B. & Ad.
619; Clark v. Perceval, 2 Id. 660;
Read v. McNulty, 12 Rich. Law 445.
This decision was again affirmed in
Sazstag v. Gonly et al., 64 Mo. 476.
On the other hand, however, such
notes have been held negotiable in several of the states.
In Houghtdn v. Francis, 29 Ill. 244
(1862), thenote sued on contained the
words, "If not paid when due, if called
for, ten per cent. interest till paid ;"
and it was held that the note was not
affected thereby, CATON, C. J., saying: "If not paid when due, upon

the special call of the payee, then the
makers agree to pay ten per cent. interest till paid. This does not make
the payment of the note conditional.
The promise to pay $275 six months
from date is absolute."
Stipulations for the payment of interest stand upon a somewhat different
ground from stipulations for other special payments, as observed by SHARsWOOD, J., in the principal case. The
precise point now under consideration
did not therefore arise in Houghton v.
Francis; but we have thought it well to
quote the language of CATON, C. J., as
it contains the germ of the argument
upon which all the cases which sustain
the negotiability of notes with such
clauses have been rested.
The earliest express decision of the
point that we have found is in Nickerson v. Sheldon, 33 Ill. 372 (1864),
where the words were, "If not paid
without suit, to pay ten dollars in addition for attorney's fees." There was a
special count on the note as a promissory note for its face amount, but not
including the additional ten dollars, and
also common counts. The defendant
having demurred, judgment was given
against him for the amount of the note
without the attorney's fee, and this judgment was affirmed by the Supreme Court,
referring to Houghton v. Francis,already
discussed.
In Sperry v. lorr, 32 Iowa 184
(1871), the words were "-if not paid
when due and suit is brought thereon,
I hereby agree to pay collection and
attorn&y fees therefor,2 and in delivering judgment, BECK, J., said, "The
sum payable by the terms of this note is
fixed and certain ; it is subject to no
increase or diminution. When it matured no inquiry was necessary to be
made as to facts not apparent on the
face of the note, in order to fix the
amount due; recovery could have been
had upon the note itself without other
evidence. The agreement.for the pay-
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ment of attorney fees in no sense
increased the amount of money which
was payable when the note fell due, and
we are unable to see that it rendered
that amount uncertain in the least degree.
Ir simply imposed an additional liability
in case suit should be brought, and such
liahility did not become absolute until
action was instituted. This agreement
relates rather to the remedy upon the
note, if a legal remedy be pursued to
enforce its collection, than to the sum
which the maker is bound to pay. It is
not different in its character from a
crgnovit which when attached to promissory notes does not destroy their negotiability."
So in Sherman v. Pyle, 35 Ind. 103
(1871), it is said by WORDEN, J.,
"The note if paid at maturity or after
maturity but before suit brought thereon
is for a sum certain. ** * In the commercial world commercial paper is expected to be paid promptly at maturity.
The stipulation for the payment of attorney's fees could have no force except
upon a violation of his contract by the
defendant."
To the same effect are the decisions
in Louisiana, Dietrich v. Jayhi et al.,
23
La. Ann. 767 (1871) ; Kentucky, Gaar
v. Louisville Banking Co., 11 Bush 180
(1876) ; and Kansas, Seaton v. Scoville
etal., Supreme Court, July Term 1877,
not yet reported, all holding that collection-fee clauses do not destroy the negotiability of notes because they do not
make the sum payable at maturity uncertain, but only impose an additional

penalty in case of breach of the contract
at the time appointed for performance,
It may be noticed that in the Pennsylvania and Missouri cases the sums payable were held uncertain as well as contingent, although the stipulation was for
the payment of a definite and precise
collection-fee, to wit, five and ten per
cent. of the amounts of the notes respectively, while in some of the other cases
(as, e. g., Sperry v. Horr, and GaarY.
Louisville Banking Co.), the agreement
was only to pay " collection" or "reasonable collection" fees, yet the latter
were held not to make the sum payable
sufficiently uncertain to destroy the negotiability of the notes. If the view
intimated by Judge StARswooD, in the
principal case, should prevail, viz.,that
fli'e per cent., though specified absolutely, is not to be taken as liquidated
damages, but only as a penalty to secure
a reasonable collection-fee, the difference
in the language would be unimportant,
but the fact that the more indefinite form
of agreement has been held not to impair
the certainty of the sum payable, is an
indication of the wide divergence between the two lines of decision.
How far the courts, which sustain the
negotiability of such notes, may be willing to go upon this point does not yet
appear, but it is noticeable as indicating
the caution of counsel in treading a new
path that in nearly if not quite all of
the cases, the plaintiffs preferred to ask
for judgment for the face of the note
waiving the collection-fee.
J. T. M.

Supreme Court of Wi8consin.
CATIIARINE DUNBAR v. J. K. GLENN

ET AL.

The owner of any peculiar natural product (as the water of a mineral spring),
which has acquired reputation and mercantile value through his industry, sagacity
and enterprise, is entitled, like the manufacturer of artificial products, to have his
original trade-mark protected.
Where a particular word, or combination of words, used as a trade-mark, by
VOL. XXV.-85
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virtue of its original signification, or by association, distinctively points to the
origin or ownership of the article to which it is applied, it will he protected.
A generic or geographical name-one which merely designates the city or district
of country where an article is manufactured or otherwise produced, or which merely
describes the quality or constituents of the article, and which can be employed with
truth by other manufacturers, is not subject to legal protection as a trade-mark.
But where a word which is generic or geographical in its origin is employed
without reference to its original descriptive or geographical sense and simply for
purposes of identification and notoriety, and by such use has acquired a value ibr
such purposes, it will be protected as a valid trade-mark.
Thus the name "Bethesda," having been applied by the plaintiff to her mineral
spring, and used as a mark or brand upon the barrels in which the waters thereof
were put up by her for shipment and sale, and recorded by her as a trade-mark in
the patent office, is a proper trade-mark ; and the fact that defendant owns another
spring within twelve hundred feet of that belonging to plaintiff, which is alleged
to have exactly the same chemical constitution and curative properties, does not
entitle him to use such trade-mark; the name "Bethesda," not being the geographical designation of any district of country or civil division within or near
which either of said springs is located.
THIS was a bill in equity, praying an injunction against the infringement of a trade-mark. The facts sufficiently appear in the
opinion.

Jenkins, E!lliott " Winkler, for appellant.
1. Complainant is entitled to protection for her trade, without
reference to her propeity in the trade-maik: Lee v: Haley, 22 Law
Times Rep., N. S. 251; Christy v. Murphy, 12 How. Pr. 77;
McCardell v. Peek, 28 Id. 120; Knott v. Morgan, 2 Keen 213;
Marsh v. Billings, 7 Cush. 326 ; Upton on Trade-marks 93; Croft
v. Day, 7 Beav. 84; Taylor v. Carpenter, 2 Sandf. Ch. 613;
Howard v. Henriques, 3 Sandf. S. C. 725; Howe v. Searing, 19
How. Pr. 14; Comstock v. Moore, 18 Id. 422; Braham v. Bustard, 1 Hen. & Munf. 447; Coffeen v. Brunton, 4 McLean 516;
Leather Cloth Co. v. Am. Leather Cloth Co., 11 Jurist N. S.513;
Amoskeag Manf. Co. v. Spear, 2 Sandf. S. C. 599; Candee v.
Deere, 10 Am. Law Reg. N. S. 694; Newman v. Alvord, 49
Barb. 588.
2. The appellant is injured even if the motives of respondent
were not fraudulent: Sykes v. Sykes, 3 B. & C. 543; Taylor v.
Carpenter, 3 Story 458; Meriden Britannia Co. v. Parker,13
Am. Law Reg. N. S. 153; but fraudulent intedt is to be presumed
in proportion to the imitation: Croft v. Day,.7 Beav. 84 ; Swift v.
Day, 4 Robt. 611; Walton v. Crowley, 3 Blatchf. 440; Burnett
v. Phalon, 9 Bosw. 198; Yetridge v. Merchant, 4 Abb. Pr. 156;
Comstock v. White, 8 How. Pr. 421. The quality of goods is not
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regarded: Blofield v. Payne, 4 B. & Ald. 410. And any imitation by which ordinary people are likely to be misled is an infringement: Browne on Trade-marks, sect. 398; Seixo v. Provizende,
Law Rep. 1 Ch. App. 192; Hostetter v. Vowinkle, 1 Dillon 329.
3. The name Bethesda is a proper subject of trade-mark. It is
the Greek form of a Hebrew word signifying "the house of mercy."
It does not indicate properties, constituent elements, grades of quality,
&c., of any substance.
4. The respondents have infringed complainant's name. See,
in addition to cases already cited, the following: Burgess v.Burgess,
17 Jur. 292; Harrisonv. Taylor, 11 Jur. (N.S.) 408; Ainsworth
v. Walmesley, 44 L. J. 252; Southron v. Reynolds, 12 L. T. 77;
Gillott v. Basterbrook, 47 Barb. 455; Olement v. Maddick, 22
Law Rep. 428; _!emson v. Bental, 3 Law Jour. (N. S.) 161; Collins v. Cowen, 3 Kay & Johns. 428; -Davis v. Kendall, 2 R: I.
566; Williams v. Johnson, 2 Bosw. 1; Burrows v. Knight, 6
R. I. 434 ; Dale v. Smith, 12 Abb. Pr. 237 ; Woodward v. Lazar,
21 Cal. 448; Afatsell v. Flannagan, 2 Abb. Pr. (N. S.) 459;
Smith v. Woodruff, 48 Barb. 438; Curtis v. Bryan, 36 How. Pr.
R. 33; .3fesserele v. Tynbery, 4 Abb. Pr. (N. S.) 400; Rowley v.
Houghton, 2 Brewst. 303; Boardman v. eredin Co., 35 Conn.
402; Colton v. 1homas, "2Brewst. 308; -Dixon Co. v. Guggenheim, Id. ; Gilles v. Hall, Id. 342; Pedding v. H7owe, 8 Sim. 477;
Morison v. Salmon, 2 Man. & Gr. 385; Hine v. Lart, 10 Jur.
106; Rodgers v. Nowill, 5 Man. & Gr..660; Hfolloway v. Holloway, 13 Beav. 209; Holloway y. .Holloway, 5 Id.; _Eddleston v.
Vick, 18 Jur. 7; McAndrews v. Basset, 10 Id. (N. S.) 550.
Cottrill & Cary, for. respondents.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
COLE, J.-Upon principles which courts of equity have often
recognised and enforced, we are satisfied that the plaintiff is entitled
to an injunction restraining the defendants from sellini, or procuring
or offering to be sold any mineral watpr represented as being "Bethesda Mineral Water," or the water dealt in or sold by the plaintiff, whether so represented by way of trade-mark, label or other
"simulated device. This is a part of the relief demanded in the
complaint, and to which upon the facts we think she is entitled.
The law in relation to trade-marks has frequently been the subject
of discussion in the courts, and it seems to be well settled that the
owner of any original trade-mark has an undoubted right to be pro-
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tected in the exclusive use of all the marks, forms or symbols that
he may appropriate as designating the true origin or ownership of
the article or fabric to which they are affixed; but he has no right
to appropriate a sign or mark which indicates the name or quality
of the goods, and which others may employ with equal truth for the
same purpose: Amoskeag Manuf. Co. v. Spear, 2 Sand. S. 0. 599;
Coats v. Holbrook, 2 Sandf. Ch. 586; Congress Spring Co. v.
High Bock Spring Co., 45 N. Y. 291; Canal Co. v. Clark, 18
Wall. 811. And the rules laid down in respect to an artificial or
manufactured article are said to apply to the proprietorship of any
peculiar natural product which a party may have acquired with
the avails of his industry, sagacity and enterprise; the owner
or vendor of the one equally with the owner or vendor of the
other having a right to the exclusive use of his mark employed
in connection with the sale of the commodity: FOLGER, J., in
Congress Spring Co. v. High Bock Spring Co., supra. It is very
obvious that this must be so, if the reason for the interference of
the court is founded upon the injury to the owner, when his trademark is invaded or the fraud upon the public, for whether the
vendible commodity be natural or artificial, the purchaser has imposed
upon him an article that he never meant to buy, and the owner "is
robbed of the fruits of the reputation that he had successfully labored
to earn:" DUER, J., Amoskeag Manufacturing Co. v. Spear.
The correctness of these principles was not seriously questioned or
controverted by the learned counsel on either side on the argument.
It only remains to determine how they affect or control this case.
It is in substance alleged in the complaint that the plaintiff has
for upwards of seven years last past been the owner of a certain
mineral spring, in the village of Waukesha, known by. the name
of and generally called the "Bethesda Mineral Spring," the waters
of which are of great virtue in the cure of diseases, and are widely
known throughout the United States for their curative properties,
and which spring is resorted to by large numbers of people from all
sections of the country to drink thereof; that during all said period
the plaintiff has offered for sale and sold and shipped to all parts of
the United States the waters of sai{t spring in barrels, which barrels are and have been labelled and branded with the plaintiff's own
pfoper device and trade-mark, adopted by her for that purpose in
the year 1869, and which consisted in the word "Bethesda" branded
on said barrels, and which said trade-mark so appropriated has been
used and known to identify and distinguish the mineral water ob-
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tained from the plaintiff's said spring. It is then alleged that the
plaintiff has caused her trade-mark to be recorded in the patent
office according to the provisions of the Act of Congress upon the
subject; that by reason of the long experience and great care of the
plaintiff in her business and the good quality of the said mineral
water the same has become widely known throughout the United
States as a valuable and useful article, has acquired a high reputation as a curative agent for specific diseases, and has commanded
and still commands an extensive sale, which is and has been a source
of great profit to the plaintiff. Further, that the water is known to
the public and to purchasers and consumers thereof by the said
name of "1B ethesda Mineral Water" and by the plaintiff's own device and trade-mark aforesaid; that in the months of May, June
and July 1876, the defendants, well knowing, but wilfully disregarding, the plaintiff's rights, fraudulently prepared and offered for sale
and did at the time this suit was commenced offer for sale at Waukesha and elsewhere water from a spring of which the defendant,
Glenn, claims to be the owner and proprietor, and the defendant
Glenny, the superintendent ormanager, which, with intent to deceive
and defraud the public and the buyers and consumers thereof, they
caused to be put up in imitation of the plaintiff's mineral water and
in similar packages, such packages being labelled with a Aealy similar label, and which false label was in the words "Glenn Bethesda
Mineral Water;" and that the defendants have caused to be published
and circulated throughout the Unitd States, and in the principal
cities thereof, where the Bethesda water of the plaintiff is most
known and used, printed circulars, one of which is annexed to and
made a part of the complaint, and that the defendants give out and
represent that the said water so offered and sold by them is the
same Bethesda water, and identical with the water from the spring
of the plaintiff, and that such imitation of the plaintiff's trade-mark
is calculated to deceive the purchasers and consumers of the mineral
water from the said Bethesda spring belonging to the'plaintiff, and
actually has and does mislead many of them to buy the article sold
and advertised by the defendants in the belief that it is the mineral
water from plaintiff's spring, greatly to the diminution of plaintiff's
irofits and business. It is also alleged that the water so put up
and sold by the defendants in imitation of the Bethesda mineral
water from the plaintiff's spring is of a greatly inferior quality and
wholly unknown and untried as to its curative properties, and that
by reason of the premises the general esteem and reputation of the
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genuine Bethesda mineral water has been injured, greatly to the
dimunition of the business and profits of the plaintiff. These are
the more material statements of the complaint.
In their answer the defendants admit that the plaintiff is the
owner of a certain mineral spring in the village of Waukesha, the
waters of which possess virtue in the cure of diseases, and which
are resorted to by numbers of people from different parts of the
country to drink; that the plaintiff has by her husband for some
years offered for sale and sold and shipped to different parts of the
United States the waters of said spring in barrels, which have been
labelled or marked in some instances with the words "Bethesda
Mineral Water, Waukesha, Wiscongin," and in others with the
word "Bethesda" only on the head of the barrels; say they have
no knowledge whether the plaintiff has caused to be recorded the
trade-mark as alleged, and deny that the word "Bethesda" can
constitute a lawful trade-mark ; admit that the water of plaintiff's
spring is of good quality when properly prepared for shipment;
that it has become widely known as a valuable and useful article;
that it has a high reputation as a curative agent; that it has a considerable sale in the United States, and that it is generally known
as Bethesda or Waukesha water. They deny that they have fraudulently pr4ared or offered for sale at Waukesha or elsewhere water
from a well or spring of which the defendant Glenn is owner or
proprietor and the defendant Glenny is superintendent with intent
to deceive the public and the buyers and consumers thereof; or that
they have caused any water to be put up or sold with any such intent in imitation of the plaintiff's mineral water or in similar packages to it, or that they have labelled any such packages with nearly
similar label to the plaintiff's alleged label or with a label in the
words of Glenn Bethesda Mineral Water. They then state that
the defendant Glenn is the owner of a spring at Waukesha, situate
some twelve hundred feet from the spring of the plaintiff; that the
waters thereof are identical in composition and properties with the
waters ofrthe spring of the plaintiff; that the defendant Glenn is
engaged in-the sale of the water of his spring and that the defendant Olenny is the superintendent thereof; that to a limited extent
circulars have been issued in the form of the one attached to the
complaint, but that when the suit was commenced the waters were
advertised by different circulars; that the barrels used by them are
not similar in form to the barrels used by the plaintiff, but are different and contain no trade-mark or device in the nature of a trade-
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mark, and are not likely to mislead or deceive the public or induce
the belief that thd barrels of the defendant Glenn are the barrels
of or contain the waters of the spring of the plaintiff; deny that
they have ever used the trade-mark of the plaintiff or any copy or
imitation, semblance or appearance thereof. They aver that the
waters of both springs have been analyzed by competent chemists,
and that the analysis shows that the waters of both springs are in
reality identical and possess the same medicinal properties. These
are the principal portions of the answer.
The motion to dissolve the injunction granted by the court commissioner was heard upon the complaint and answer and exhibits
annexed, and also upon the affidavits of Richard Dunbar and J. K.
Glenn, the former in support of the injunction and the latter opposed
thereto. But upon the case presented we are of the opinion indicated that the injunction should have been continued until the hearing
of the cause upon the merits.
Notwithstanding the denial of the defendants, it is difficult to
believe that in advertising and selling the water of the Glenn spring
in the way it was advertised and sold, the public were not in fact
deceived and had reason to suppose when they purchased those
waters they were really obtaining the waters of the plaintiff's spring.
At all events it seems a fair inference from all the facts that the
defendant Glenn attempted to avail himself of the benefit of the
plaintiff's trade-mark, and to appropriate the good-will of a business
which the enterprise and care of the plaintiff had established. This
was certainly calculated to injure the plaintiff and diminish the
profits of her business. It is admitted that the Bethesda spring had
become widely known as a valuable and useful commodity or article
of commerce, and had a high reputation as a remedial agent in a
certain class of diseases. And it is impossible to believe that the
defendant Glenn, who owned another spring at Waukesha, did not
seek to avail himself of that reputation by the means he resorted to,
in advertising and selling the. water of his own spring. What he
did do was directly calculated to induce persons to believe that in
buying the water thus advertised they were obtaining that from the
.plaintiff's spring, which had an established reputation. There is
an implied admission in the affidavit of Mr. Glenn that prior to the
service of the injunctional order he had advertised in circulars his
spring as the "Glenn Bethesda Mineral Water of Waukesha," thus
appropriating the word "Bethesda," which was really the trade-
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mark of the plaintiff. Under these circumstances the case seems
to come fully within the principles of the decision in Congress Spring
Co. v. HZigh Rock Spring Co., supra, and cases of a kindred character, and must be ruled by them. It is true in the Congress Spring
Case the names or initials of the successive proprietors of Congress
Spring were upon the bottles containing the water, upon the corks
of the bottles and upon the boxes in which the bottles were packed
for transportation. This method served to indicate both the origin
and proprietorship of the water of Congress Spring, while in the case
before us the word "Bethesda" may only indicate the origin of
the water. However this may be, it is sufficient to constitute it a
trade-mark within the doctrine of the adjudications.
The learned counsel for the defendants insisted that the word
"Bethesda" as used by the plaintiff denotes the kind, character,
quality or utility of the water of her spring and therefore could not
be a lawful trade-mark. But we do not understand that the plaintiff uses or applies the word in any such sense or for any such purpose.
It will avail little to resort to the original meaning of the word
"Bethesda" as defined by Biblical writers. It is sufficient to say
that the word as used by the plaintiff does not describe any quality
of the water. It seems to have been adopted to indicate origin or
ownership and to have a name by which the water could be distinguished when bought and sold in the market. The plaintiff has
the right to the exclusive use -of the word when employed as a trademark for such a purpose. The cases cited on the brief of defendant's
counsel clearly recognise such a right. Where the trade-mark in
its original signification or by association distinctively points to the
origin or ownership of the article to which it is applied, it will be
protected. But where it is a generic or geographical name designating a city or district of country or is merely descriptive of the
article manufactured, and which can be employed with truth by
other.manufacturers, it is not entitled to legal protection as a trademark: Canal Co. v. Olark, supra; Brooklyn White Lead Co. v.
Masury, 25 Barb. S. C. 416; Wolfe v. Gaulard, 18 How. P. R.
64; Burke v. Cassin, 45 Cal. 468 ; Stokes v. Landgraff, 17 Barb.
S. C. 608; Corwin v. Daly, 7 Bosw. 222; Caswell v. Davis, 58
N. Y. 223 ; Taylor v. Gillies, 59 Id. 331 ; qkoyuski v. Colieu, 89
Cal. 501; Perry v. Truefitt, 6 Beavan 66. But this case does not
fall within any of the exceptions stated to the rule in the above
cases. Here the plaintiff adopted and applied the name "Bethesda"
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to her spring to mark or distinguish the waters thereof in the market
and she has the right to its exclusive use. It is not intended to
nor does it indicate the quality or constituents of the water, but
rather its origin or ownership, and as a name for distinguishing the
water by which it may be bought and sold.
It follows from these views that the order of the Circuit Court,
dissolving the injunction, must be reversed and the cause remanded
for further proceedings according to law.

Court of 2rrors and Appeals of Jaryland.
STATE OF MIARYLAND, usE oF ALLEN, v. PITTSBURGH AND

CONNELLSVILLE RAILROAD CO.
In an action under the Maryland statute against a corporation operating a railroad lying partly in Maryland and partly in Pennsylvania, chartered bT the laws
of both states, brought in Maryland for the use of the widow and infant child of a
deceased person, who was killed while in the employment of the defendant, by an
accident occurring in Pennsylvania, it was held:-1. That this statute did not apply to the case of a wrongful act or neglect occurring in another state, whereby death had been caused.
2. That in the absence of anything to the contrary, the presumption was that
the common law prevailed in the state where the alleged wrong was done, and the
courts here acting upon that presumption afforded the common-law remedy for the
injury complained of.
3. Bat that no such presumption obtained respecting the positive statute law of
the state.
4. That it was immaterial that the deceased was a citizen of this state at the
time of his'death.
The case of The Northern Central Railway Co. v. Scholl, 16 Md. 331, distinguished from this case on the ground that the wrong complained of in that case
was in violation of a right that the wrongdoer was bound to respect everywhere
within the limits of the United States, and therefore the case involved no consideration of the mere local law of Pennsylvania.

from the Circuit Court for Allegheny county.
The appeal in this case was taken by the plaintiffs from the action
of the court below overruling their demurrer to the defendant's plea
and quashing the writ. The case is stated in the opinion of this
court.
APPEAL

Thomas . aonderand A. H.-Blackiston, for the appellants.The appellee is a corporation chartered by the state of Maryland,
and under its charter may sue and be sued: Act of 1853, ch. 88.
Vor. XXV.-86
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And by sect. 14 of said act, "said company shall keep in the
county of Allegheny, in this state, a director, officer or other agent
of said company, and if any legal proceedings shall be commenced
against said company in Allegheny county, or in the United States
courts in this state, legal process in such proceedings may be served
on such director, officer or agent, and such service shall be a good
and sufficent service on said company for all purposes whatsoever."
A personal tort committed against a citizen of Maryland in another
state may be redressed by action against the wrongdoer in the courts
of Maryland, whenever he comes within its limits: Northern Central Railway Co. v. Scholl's Adm'r, 16 A.d. 331. If Thomas
Allen had lived, after the injury received, and he could have shown
negligence on the part of the appellee or its agents which caused
his injury, there is no doubt that he would have had a clear right
to sue and maintain his suit against the appellee in this state, Vut
unfortunately he died, and any suit against the appellee by him
was for ever precluded. The laws of Maryland, however, enacted
for the benefit of its citizens, step in and in effect say, that the
wrongdoer shall not escape, and although the injured party is dead
the right of action shall survive him for the injury done, and his
widow and helpless children shall be compensated, so far as money
can compensate-them, for the wrong and injury done their husband
and father, no matter where it happens. This is the plain meaning
and purpose of art. 65 of the"Cede.
In all actions for injuries, ex delicto, to the person, or to personal
property, the venue is in general transitory and may be laid in any
county, though committed out of the jurisdiction of the court or out
of the state: Northern Central Railway Co. v. Scholl's Adm'r,
16 Md. 331.
The injury complained of in the case at bar is an injury to the
person arising ex delicto; hence the case in 16 Md. 331, is applicable, and the court below erred in overruling the appellant's demurrer
and quashing the writ.
B?. Chew: .Jones,for the appellee.-This action cannot be maintained at common law, because it is a well-settled principle of the
law that all rights of action for injury to the person dies with the
person.
The appellants therefore base their claim solely upon the Maryland statute: Code, art. 65, sects. 1 and 2; Whiford v. Panama
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Railroad Co., 23 N. Y. 465, 478; Shearman & Redfield on Negligence, sects..2 9 0, 295; Crowley v. Panama Railroad Co., 30
Barb. 99; 2 Hilliard on Torts 501, note c; Yerton v. Wigewall,
16 How. (N.Y.) 8; Blake v. Midland Railroad Co., 18 Q. B.
93 (A. & E., N. S.), 83 Eng. C. L. Rep.; Safford v.Drew, 8 Duer
638.
The accident, injury and death, all occurred in the state of Pennsylvania, and the Maryland statute, giving a right of action where
the wrongful-act results in death, does not and cannot apply to acts
done out of the state, and this on the ground that statutes have no
extra territorial force: Whitford v. Panama Railroad Co., 23 N.
Y. 465, 484; Vandeventer v. . Y. & N. Hf. Railroad Co., 27
Barb. 244, 247; Crowley v. Panama Railroad Co., 30 Id. 99,
110 ; Woodward v.M. S. & X. Ind. Railroad Co., 20. Ohio St.
121; Bichardson v.N. Y. Central Railroad Co., 98 Mass. 85;
Veedham v.Grand Trunk Railroad Co., 38 Verm. 294, 807;
Great Western Railroad Co. v.Mller, 19 Mich. 805.
The Maryland statute gives a new right and not merely a new
remedy: Blake v. Midland Railroad Co., 18 Q. B. (A. & E., N.

S.) 93.
The jurisdiction of the court depends upon the place of the accident, and not the place of the death, and in the case at bar both
occurred in the state of Pennsylvania: Crowley v.Panama Railroad Co., 80 Barb. 99, 106; Needham v. Grand Trunk Railroad
Co., 38 Verm. 294, 307.
Jurisdiction of the person of the defendant does not include jurisdiction of the subject matter of the action: Crowley v. Panama
Railroad Co., 30 Barb. 106; Whiford v. PanamaRailroad Co.,
23 N. Y. 465, 480.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
A~vEY, J.-This is an action brought in the name of the state,
as legal plaintiff, for the use of the widow and infant child of
Thomas Allen, deceased, who was killed while in the employment
of the defendants, as fireman on a locomotive engine, in January
1874. The adtion is brought under the 65th article of the Code,
sects. 1 and 2, which gives a right of action wlenever the death
of a person shall be caused by the wrongful act, neglect or default
of another, "and the act, neglect or default is such as would (if
death had not ensued) have entitled the party injured to maintain -
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an action and recover damage in respect thereof." The action is
required to be brought in the name of the state, for the benefit of
the wife, husband, parent or child, as the case may be, of the person
whose death shall have been so caused; "and in every such action
the jury may give such damages as they may think proportioned to
the injury resulting from such death to the parties respectively for
whose benefit such action shall'be brought, and the amount so
recovered, after deducting the costs not recovered from the defendant, shall be divided amongst the above-mentioned parties, in such
shares as the jury by their verdict shall find and direct."
The declaration makes all proper averments to entitle the plaintiffs to maintain the action under the statute; but the defendants
have pleaded that the accident and injuries to the deceased, resulting
in his death, "happened and occurred in the state of Pennsylvania,
and beyond the territorial limits of the state of Maryland." To
this plea the plaintiffs demurred; and in connection with the issue

of law thus presented, it is admitted by agreement that both the
injury to and the death of Allen occurred in the state of Pennsylvania, and that, at the time of such injury and death, the deceased
was a citizen and resident of this state, in the employ of the
defendants.
The defendants were incorporated by acts of the legislatures of this
state and of the state of Pennsylvania, and operate their railroad
leading from the city of Cuinberland, in Maryland, to the city of
Pittsburgh, in Pennsylvania.
The question presented is, whether the statute of this state, under
which the present action is brought, embraces and can be made to
apply to the case of a wrongful act or neglect occurring in another
state whereby death has been caused? The court below overruled
the demurrer, and gave judgment for the 4efendants, and that judgment, we think, is sustainable both upon reason and authority.
It is very true, as a general proposition, that actions for injuries,
ex delicto,to the person, or to personal property, are transitory, and
the venue may be laid in any county, though the wrong be committed out 6f the jurisdiction of the court or beyond the territorial
limits of the state: Northern Central Railroad Co. v. Scholl, 16
Md. 331. But when the wrong has been actually committed in a
foreign jurisdiction the action is maintained here upon certain welldefined presumptions of law, which cannot apply in a case like the
present. When a party who has suffered a personal injury; or injury
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to his personal property, in another state, and seeks redress against
the wrongdoer here, he brings with him from the foreign jurisdiction his cause of action; and the courts here entertain his appeal
for redress upon the assumption that the act complained of was a
wrong by the laws of the state where committed. If not an actionable wrong there, it would be contrary to all reason that it should
be made, one by simply invoking redress of the courts here. If
that could be done, it would be in the power of one state to prescribe rules, no matter low arbitrary, to govern persons and things
in another state; and thus 'contravene the fundamental principles
maintained by all nations, that every independent state has an
exclusive right to regulate persons and. things within its own territorial limits, and that the laws of a state or country "can have no
intrinsic force, proprio viqore, except within the territorial limits
and jurisdiction of that country :" Story's Conflict of Laws, sects.
7, 22.
In the absence of anything to the contrary, the presumption is
that the common law prevails in the state where the alleged wrong
was done, and the courts here, acting upon that presumption, afford
the common-law remedy for injury complained of. But, as was
said by DENIO, J., in Whitford v. PanamaRailroad Co., 23 N. Y.
468, "no such presumption obtains respecting the positive statute
law of the state. There is generally no probability in point of fact,
and there is never any presumption of law that other states or
countries have established, precisely or substantially, the same arbitrary rules which the domestic legislature has seen fit to enact."
This presumption, as to the prevailing existence of the common
law, is indulged upon principles of comity and general convenience;
but the courts here will never apply to acts done in a foreign jurisdiction, which may not be unlawful there, the arbitrary rules that
shall have been prescribed by our legislature, with respect to rights
and remedies, wholly at variance with the settled rules of the common law. Indeed, it is not to be supposed that the legislature ever
intended that the statute should apply to acts of the nature mentioned, if committed beyond the limits of the state.
Now, it is not pretended here that this action is maintainable at
the common law. The principle upon which it is founded is wholly
at variance with the settled rules of that system of jurisprudence.
The right of action is given, not to the personal representative
of the deceased, but to the state, for the benefit of the widow or
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husband, as the case may be, and certain named next of kin. The
recovery does not constitute assets of the deceased's estate, but
is allowed exclusively in respect of the pecuniary loss that the
parties, for whose use the action is brought, may have sustained.
It is clear, therefore, that the statute gives to the parties named an
entirely new-right of action, founded on principles quite different
and distinct from those known to the common law: Blake v. The
Midland Railroad Co., 18 Q. B. 98. And such being the right
and the remedy prescribed by the statute, 'it is clear that the acts
complained of, having been committed beyond the jurisdiction
of the state, were not made tortious and actionable by that statute,
and therefore not within the remedy afforded by it; and it is quite
immaterial that the deceased was a citizen of this state at the time
of his death.
The question, arising on statutes in many respects similar to our
own, as to the right to maintain the action, in one form or another, in
a jurisdiction other than that in which the injury was received by the
deceased, has been considered and thoroughly discussed by several
state courts of high authority, and in all the cases where the question has been considered by the courts of last resort, the decision
has been adverse to the right of-maintaining the action. Such has
been the decision in New York, Massachusetts, Vermont, Ohio and
Georgia, as will appear by reference to W-tford v. PanamaRailroad Co., 28 N. Y. 465; Beach v. Bay &ate Co., 30 Barb. 488;
Rihardson v.' N. Y. Central -RailroadCo., 98 Mass. 85; Needham v. Grand Trunk Railroad Co., 88 Vt. 295; Woodward v.
The Railway Co., 10 Ohio St. 121, and Selma Railroad Co. v.
Lacy, 48 Geo. 461. And the result of all the authorities upon
the question is briefly but clearly stated by Shearman and Redfield, in their work on Negligence, sect. 296, 3d ed., where it is
said: "The operation of these statutes is limited to the territory
of the states which have enacted them. No action can be maintained upon one of these statutes if the deceased person received
the fatal injury at a place not within the limits of the state by which
such statute-was enacted, whether such place be in another state or
upon the high seas. It makes no difference in this respect that
both parties to the injury were citizens of the state by which the
statute was enacted, or that the wrongdoer was a corporation chartered by that state, or that the negligence causing the injury was a
breach of a contract entered into in that state. And it. has been
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held, in Massachusetts, that no action will lie upon such a statute
outside of the state enacting it." For these several propositions
authorities are cited.
The case of the Northern Central Railroad Co. v. Scholl, 16
Md. 331, relied on by the plaintiffs, has no application to this
case. That was a common-law action, for injury to the right of
personal property, under the protection of the Constitution and
laws of the United States. Though the wrong was done in Pennsylvania, it was in violation of a rfght that the wrongdoer was bound
to respect everywhere within the limits of the United States, and.
therefore the case involved no consideration of the mere local law
of Pennsylvania.
The judgment of the court below must be affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
Supreme Court of Vermont.
RICHARDSON v. GRANDY

AN ANOTHER.

Representations by the vendor, of the quality of the thing sold, or of its fitness
for a particular purpose, intended as a part of the contract of sale, and relied upon
by the vendee, constitute a contract of warranty.
And when there is such a contract, the vendee has a right of action, by proving
the contract and its breach, and is under no legal obligation to return the property,
or to give notice of its defects ; his retention and use of it, and neglect to give
notice of its defects, being material only upon the question of damages. Thus,
defendants sold plaintiff a second-hand machine, to be so repaired as to 11be equal
in all respects to a new one of the same kind," and plaintiff kept it three months
*before setting it up, and three months afterwards,.before finally rejecting it. The
court charged that if plaintiff kept it longer than was reasonably necessary to
'inspect and test it in the respect counted upon, without giving notice of any defect,
he had impliedly accepted it. Held, no error.
The defendants offered to send a mechanic to set up the machine, and the plaintiff replied that he should want him, and when ready would send for him, but he
employed another mechanic instead, who, as the defendants alleged, was incompetent. Hed, that it was not a part of the agreement that the machine should be set
up by defendants' mechanic, and that although plaintiff could not cast upon defendants the mischief caused by the unskilfulness with which the machine was set up,
yet he would not necessarily be precluded by his omission to have the defendants'
mechanic set up the machine, from recovering for defects therein that were a breach
of contract.

upon a warranty in the sale of a clap-board planer.
Plea, the general issue, and trial by jury.
The plaintiff's evidence tended to show that in December 1871,
he met the defendant Grandy, and learned from him that defendants
ASSUMPSIT
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had a second-hand clap-board planer that they had replaced by a
new one; that soon afterwards the plaintiff and the defendants had
correspondence, in course of which the plaintiff asked the defendants
what they would take for their old machine, and the defendants
replied that they would take $200 for it delivered on the cars in
St. Johnsbury in such repair .that it should "be equal in all respects
to a n6w one of its kind," and that if the plaintiff desired, they
would send their foreman, who had had experience with the machine,
to assist in setting it up, and to instruct the plaintiff's men in
running it, to which the plaintiff replied, accepting the defendants'
offer according to its terms, and saying that he should want the
defendants' foreman to assist, as the defendants had suggested, and
that he would write again when ready for him. The plaintiff's evidence further tended to show, that the machine was duly received,
but was not get up until about three months afterwards; that then,
instead of sending for defendants' man, the plaintiff employed a
practical millwright, who was unable to put it in working order,
but who, as he admitted, had never set up such a machine before;
that plaintiff then wrote the defendants that the machine was very
imperfect, that it would not do good work, and that he should expect
them to take it and "make him whole" in the matter, to which the
defendants replied that the plaintiff was in fault in having employed
an inexperienced man to set it up, but that they would send a man
to put it in working order adcording to agreement, if plaintiff would
pay for his services; that the plaintiff wrote again, saying that he
did not think it could be made to do good work, and that he would
not pay the defendants' man unless he should make it; that shortly
after that the defendant Grandy spent some time in trying to make
it work properly, for which the plaintiff paid him $10 ; that plaintiff then used it during the following three months, but that'it never
did, nor could be made to, do good work; that after the three months
plaintiff wrote the defendants several times, asking if they had a
man who could run the machine, and proposing to make an exchange
with them, to which the defendants replied, denying their obligation
to the plaifitiff, and refusing to do anything in the premises.
The defendants' testimony tended to show that the machine did
good work during all the time they had it in use, that the mechanic
who set it up for thd plaintiff was incompetent, that he belted it
improperly, and ran it at too great speed, and that the plaintiff's
failure to make it of service was wholly due to those causes.
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The defendants.requested the eourt to charge that, as there was
no warranty, the transactions at the time the defendant Grandy went
to put the machine in order, together with the lapse of time between
the sale and those transactions, and between those transactions and
the plaintiff's last letter, constituted an acceptance of the machine,
and a waiver of all defects, and that as the plaintiff had not complied
with the agreement to have the defendants' man set up the machine,
he could not recover. But the court charged that the :warranty
counted upon was as to the general character and capacity of the
machine-the promise "to have the machine repaired and made as
good as new of the kind," that if the plaintiff kept it longer than
was reasonably necessary in order to inspect itj test and prove its
quality, in the respect counted upon in the declaration, without
complaint or notice of any defect, it would be an implied acceptance
thereof, unless there were latent defects that common vigilance would
not discover; but that if the plaintiff kept it no longer after it was
put in order by the defendant Grandy than was reasonably necessary to test its character and working, in order to determine whether
it was "as good as new of the kind," then there was no implied
acceptance. The court also charged that the plaintiff's omission to
have the defendants' mechanic set up the machine, would not necessarily preclude a recovery, provided the machine had inherent
defects that were a breach of the contract ; but that the plaintiff
could not cast upon the defendants the burden of any mischief caused
by the unskilful manner in which the plaintiff had set it up and
attempted to use it. To the refusal to charge as requested, and to
the charge as given, the defendants excepted.
G-rout (Baldwin and Kendall with him), for the defendant.
-Dillinghama,for the plaintiff.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
J.-This is an action'of assumpsit to recover damages
for a breach of warranty in the sale of the articles of machinery
described in the plaintiff's declaration. The only exceptions taken
upon the trial wiere for non-compliance by the court with the requests
made by the defendants, and to the charge upon the subject-matter
6f the requests. The first request is based in part upon the assumption that there was no evidence in the case that tended to show that
there was any warranty of the machinery. While it is true that
representations descriptive of the thing sold, or which may be taken
as expressive of the opinion of the vendor, do not necessarily import
ROYCE,
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